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Abstract: Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental 
representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception 
is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may 
be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual 
and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 
2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and 
cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This 
paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that 
perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary 
and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism 
marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, 
analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, 
digital) perceptual object representations. 
§1. Introduction 
Most philosophical writing on the nature of perceptual representation focuses on content. For 
example, philosophers have debated whether perception has conceptual content (Heck 2000; 
Byrne 2005), high-level content (Bayne 2009; Brogaard 2013), and rich conscious content 
(Cohen & Dennett 2011; Block 2014a), just to name a few disputes.1 
This preoccupation with content, though fruitful in many respects, is peculiar. 
Elsewhere in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, debates center around the vehicles of 
                                                 
1 There is also fierce debate about whether perception has content at all (Brewer 2006; Schellenberg 2011). I will 
not argue for the assumption that perception is representational except indirectly, by demonstrating the 
explanatory benefits of positing particular types of representational structure. 
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content—mental representations themselves, and how they, rather than their contents, are 
structured. For example, debates about whether there is a language of thought (Fodor 1975; 
Dennett 1978), whether some thoughts are map-like (Camp 2007; Rescorla 2009), whether 
concepts are sensory-based (Prinz 2002; Carey 2009), whether representations are stored in 
the language faculty (Chomsky 1980; Devitt 2006), whether implicit attitudes are associative 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen 2006; Mandelbaum 2016), whether reasoning is formal or 
model-based (Braine & O’Brien 1998; Johnson-Laird 2006), the structure and development 
of mathematical cognition (Carey 2009; Dehaene 2011), and the nature of mental imagery 
(Pylyshyn 2002; Kosslyn et al. 2006) all primarily concern representational vehicles and their 
structures.  
There is good reason for this focus on vehicles throughout cognitive science. Mental 
representations are the elements of mental computational processes. Contents may be such 
exotic entities as sets of possible worlds or Fregean senses, while the vehicular properties of 
mental representations play a direct causal/computational role in the mind.2 A full 
understanding of how mental representations function in the mind and produce behavior thus 
requires a grasp on their representational structures as well as their contents.  
In addition to aiding our understanding of the functional role of perception, a theory 
of how perceptual representations are structured may furnish us with an account of how 
perceiving differs from thinking. In recent years, a movement has been building that seeks to 
distinguish perception from cognition by appeal to the structure of perceptual representation. 
If perceptual representations are structured differently than cognitive representations, then we 
may be able to draw the border between perception and cognition by appeal to differences in 
representational structure. This representational strategy for drawing the perception–cognition 
border may help explain phenomenological, epistemological, and functional differences 
between perceiving and thinking. For example, the apparent richness and fine-grainedness of 
perceptual phenomenology may reside in the unconceptualized structure of perceptual states 
(Evans 1982; Tye 2006; Block 2014a; cf. Cohen & Dennett 2011). The view that perceptual 
representations have a distinct epistemic role from belief (Pryor 2000; cf. Sellars 1956; Siegel 
2017) could be explicated in part by their having a structure unlike that of belief (Hopp 2011). 
And differences in format suggest differences in computational role (e.g., an unconceptualized 
                                                 
2 Endorsing the truth of this claim does not require denying that mental computations may also be in some sense 
sensitive to the contents of computed representations (Rescorla 2014), nor that some semantic properties may be 
directly available to computational processes. 
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perceptual representation might not be able to figure in deductive inference), which may 
provide a partial characterization of the different functional roles of perception and thought. 
Some theorists instead pursue an architectural strategy, which aims to ground the 
perception–cognition border in non-representational aspects of mental architecture, such as 
the encapsulation of perception from cognition (Firestone & Scholl 2016; Byrne & Siegel 
2017; Mandelbaum forthcoming; Quilty-Dunn 2017).3 While the representational strategy 
seeks a representation-based distinction between perceiving and thinking, the architectural 
strategy seeks a distinction based in different types of processes. The architectural strategy 
therefore allows in principle that perception delivers the same sort of representations used in 
thought (Pylyshyn 2003). Opponents of the architectural strategy appeal to top–down 
influences of cognition on perception to undermine the notion of an architectural border 
between the two systems (Prinz 2006; Clark 2013; Lupyan 2015). 
Fred Dretske (1981, 135ff; 2000, 150), Susan Carey (2009, 8), Tyler Burge (2014a, 
488; 2014b, 574), and Ned Block (2014b, 560; ms.) all pursue a version of the 
representational strategy according to which perceptual representations are individuated at 
least partly in virtue of their format. More specifically, they claim that the format of perceptual 
representation is iconic (or image-like, or analog) while the format of thought is discursive (or 
language-like, or digital). This paper constitutes a critical evaluation of this thesis. While there 
is evidence for iconic representations in perception, I will argue for perceptual pluralism, the 
thesis that perception delivers both iconic and discursive representations. Though I will not 
defend the architectural strategy directly, perceptual pluralism undermines the representational 
strategy pursued by Dretske, Carey, Burge, and Block. The failure of this prominent 
representation-based approach suggests theorists interested in the perception–cognition border 
should look to other strategies, including architectural ones.4 
                                                 
3 The architectural strategy can invoke other non-representational factors such as stimulus dependence (Camp 
2009; Beck forthcoming), the use of special algorithms, or even simply the use of certain brain areas. 
Encapsulation has often taken pride of place in architectural approaches to the perception–cognition border, 
perhaps because of its historical connection to the perennially popular cognitivist approach to the mind outlined 
by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988; see also Fodor 1981; Pylyshyn 1984; 1999). 
4 Perceptual pluralism is compatible with non-architectural approaches (whatever they might look like), and even 
with eliminativist approaches to the perception–cognition border (Shea 2014; Lupyan 2015). However, the 
arguments in this paper presuppose a border and use experimental evidence to distinguish perceptual processes 
from cognitive ones. 
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The arguments below assume some core claims of representational strategists. First, it’s 
assumed that at least some iconic formats are in some substantive way proprietary to 
perception. That is not meant to preclude the use of iconic representations outside of 
perception; iconic representations can be used offline in mental imagery, for instance (Block 
ms.). But I will assume that (e.g.) some icons have a specifically visual format, and that this 
format is distinctly visual even when deployed in non-perceptual contexts such as visual 
imagery, as is arguably suggested by modality-specific functional interactions between imagery 
and perception (Kosslyn & Pomerantz 1977; Pearson et al. 2015).5  
Second, it’s assumed in what follows that showing the presence of discursive format in 
perception is sufficient to establish the form of perceptual pluralism rejected by the 
representational strategists mentioned above. It is in principle possible that there might be 
discursive formats that differ from the discursive format of thought. However, none of the 
theorists who pursue the representational strategy outline what this sort of nonconceptual 
discursive format might be, and it is yet less clear how such a format might be invoked to 
explain the evidence detailed below. Moreover, the thesis that perception delivers 
representations couched in the same discursive format as cognitive representations offers to 
explain how some perceptual representations feed so quickly and effortlessly into the updating 
of beliefs and the rational planning of action; the commonality of format would allow 
cognition to act immediately on the outputs of perception without any intermediating 
translation mechanism. There is thus some independent reason to think that, if there are 
discursive representations in perception, then they have the same format as discursive 
representations in cognition. Indeed, it is a strength of architectural strategies that they allow 
for a commonality of format between perception and cognition while also providing a 
principled distinction between the two systems (Mandelbaum forthcoming). I will therefore 
assume that demonstrating the presence of both iconic and discursive formats in perception 
provides abductive evidence in favor of perceptual pluralism and against the representational 
strategy. 
                                                 
5 It’s compatible with this claim, and indeed with the claims of representational strategists more generally, that 
there are also iconic formats that are in no sense proprietary to perception. There may for instance be cognitive 
maps that are iconic without being tied to a particular modality. What exactly makes an iconic format proprietarily 
perceptual is a question of significant interest, but I cannot provide an extensive discussion here. One simple 
distinction may be that amodal icons like cognitive maps are simply never deployed in perceptual systems—
though for theorists who hold that iconicity is the mark of perceptual systems, this claim would have to be 
qualified to avoid circularity. 
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§2. Representational Format 
Formats are general types of representational structures. The sentence ‘This is a tiger’ and a 
picture of a tiger differ in representational format. The phrases ‘brown cow’ and ‘large yawning 
tiger’ have distinct structures but do not differ in format, since they are both instances of 
English phrases—the difference in representational structure does not mark a difference in 
format. Different formats are akin to different languages, such that representations that are 
couched in different formats typically cannot compose together (though new hybrid formats, 
like hybrid languages, can arise through convention or stipulation in some meta-language). 
Examples of distinct representational formats include maps, graphs, diagrams, sentences, 
photographs, hieroglyphs, and blueprints. Some of these formats share relevant structural 
features, but they all differ enough in how they exploit representational structures and compose 
representational parts that they each constitute a distinct format. 
Perhaps the most influential and fundamental distinction between formats in cognitive 
science is the distinction between iconic and discursive representations. According to the 
mainstream cognitivist viewpoint in the past half century, beliefs and other propositional 
attitudes are discursive (Fodor 1975; 1987; Chomsky 1980; Pylyshyn 1984; Carey 2009; 
Burge 2010). The systematic and productive ways that concepts seem to recombine into 
thoughts (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988), the formal/logical character of deductive inference 
(Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018b), and the word-sized associative links involved in 
semantic priming (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018a) all call for a theory of propositional 
thought as literally structured like a sentence or proposition and breaking down into smaller 
parts that are syntactically concatenated with one another. Though the discursivity of thought 
remains controversial, I will assume that at least some thoughts are discursive. 
Many who believe that thought is typically discursive also believe that there are mental 
icons, endorsing a pluralist view about mental representation generally (Fodor 1975; Kosslyn 
1980; 1994; Dretske 1981; Kosslyn et al. 2006; Camp 2007; 2009; Carey 2009; Rescorla 
2009; Burge 2010; Kulvicki 2015; Block ms.). Before surveying the empirical evidence in favor 
of iconic representations in perceptual systems, it will be useful to characterize the distinction 
between iconic and discursive formats. 
There are two key differences between iconic and discursive representations. The first 
is that parts of icons correspond to parts of what they represent, while this need not be true of 
discursive representations. Typically, distance relations between parts of icons correspond to 
distance relations in what is represented (Kosslyn et al. 2006).  
6 
 
The second difference is that icons represent holistically, i.e., parts of icons encode 
various properties at once. Icons do not represent by means of a canonical decomposition into 
constituents that stand separately for distinct individuals and distinct features, while discursive 
representations may and ordinarily do have such a canonical decomposition. 
These principles are not meant to constitute a definition of iconicity or discursivity. 
My aim is merely to point out some intuitive properties of paradigm cases of iconic 
representation  and show how invoking these properties can explain aspects of perception and 
imagery. Iconicity as it appears in cognitive science is a natural psychological kind, and thus 
cannot be defined a priori. A full characterization of iconicity will instead emerge from 
empirically grounded theorizing about perception and imagery.  
Consider the difference between a picture of Bob Dylan wearing a checkered shirt (Fig. 
1) and the sentence  
(1) Bob Dylan is wearing a checkered shirt.  
 
Figure 1—Dylan wearing a checkered shirt 
Parts of this picture correspond to parts of Dylan (or his guitar, the background, etc.). The 
part that corresponds to his shirt also consists of parts that correspond to parts of his shirt. 
One can point simultaneously to two parts of the picture that correspond to parts of the left 
side of his collar; one can then move one finger over to a part that corresponds to a part of the 
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right side of his collar. The increase in distance between ostended parts of the picture 
corresponds to an increase in distance between parts of the shirt.6 
 The picture also encodes properties in a holistic fashion. The part of the picture that 
represents the left side of the collar of Dylan’s shirt also represents its shape, its visual texture, 
and its (achromatic) color properties. There is no “canonical decomposition” (Fodor 2007, 
108) of the picture into discrete parts each of which can stand uniquely for a particular 
individual or a particular property.7 Each part of the icon encodes location values along 
represented spatial axes as well as features instantiated at that location.8 
A sentence like (1) lacks these properties. No part of (1) represents part of Dylan (nor 
do parts of the name ‘Bob Dylan’). Distance relations among parts of (1) also do not track 
distance relations in what is represented. And finally, some parts of (1) represent individual 
items or properties without being holistically bound up with other items or properties. For 
example, ‘checkered’ represents a surface texture without representing the object that has that 
texture, its specific shape, its location in the scene, etc. Discursive representations like (1) have 
                                                 
6 This distance-preservation principle is not a necessary feature of icons. Even icons that tend to obey it, such as 
photographs, do so in a way that is indexed to particular spatial coordinates. For example, two spots right next to 
each other on a (two-dimensional) photograph might represent parts of the scene that are remote on the z-axis of 
the three-dimensional scene—think of a photo taken at the top of the Grand Canyon pointing straight down, 
such that a part of the photo representing the ground right at one’s feet might be adjacent to a part representing 
the bottom of the canyon. It also seems at least conceptually possible that there could be a format in which parts 
of representations correspond to parts of what they represent, but the way parts are organized fail to preserve 
structural relations such as distance. One might argue that a section of a pie chart, for example, has spatial parts 
that correspond to parts of what it represents—if it represents a segment of the population in favor of a certain 
policy, greater support for the policy is represented by more parts in the relevant segment. Yet spatial relations 
between parts of a segment may not express anything about the relations between the people in favor of the policy. 
In addition to the isomorphism of distance preservation, computations over icons in human minds also tend to 
exhibit a “second-order isomorphism” (Shepard & Chipman 1970), where computational relations between 
representations mirror relations between objects or stages of objects; see the discussion of mental imagery in 
Section 3.1.  
7 Fodor (2007) also argues, following Kosslyn (1980), that one can freely segment icons spatially and preserve 
semantic significance, such that icons have no canonical decompositions of any sort. Nothing below hangs on 
whether this claim is true. 
8 These properties of icons hold of parts down to some level of fineness of grain; there will inevitably be parts 
(e.g., individual molecules) that fail to represent anything, let alone some part of the scene or holistically bound 
clusters of features (Fodor 2008, 173n6). This suggests that icons must break down into primitive representational 
parts, though what counts as a primitive part will be relative to a particular type of representation (e.g., the 
primitive parts of some photographs may be pixels, each of which corresponds to some part of the scene and 
represents values along color and spatial dimensions). 
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canonical decompositions into a relatively small number of constituents rather than consisting 
of an array of parts that holistically bind featural information. 
The core difference between iconic and discursive representations is that the latter do, 
and the former do not, break down into recombinable parts each of which can stand uniquely 
for a particular property, location, or individual. 
The term ‘iconic’ has been used for decades in cognitive science to refer to 
representations with the properties just mentioned (Neisser 1967; Kosslyn 1980; Kosslyn et al. 
2006; Fodor 2007; Carey 2009). Burge, for example, writes that “perceptual representation 
has a structure relevantly like that of pictorial representation” such that “[j]ust as one cannot 
draw a line without drawing its length, shape, and orientation, one cannot visually represent 
an environmental edge as such without representing its length, shape, and orientation, as such” 
(Burge 2014b, 493). 
Dretske (1981; 2000) argues that perceptual representations are analog in that they 
contain “non-nested” information. The information that s is F “nests” the information that s 
is G if there’s some analytic or nomic relation between s’s being F and s’s being G. For example, 
a representation of some determinate shade of red “nests” information about the category red 
as well as simply color. For Dretske, analog representations always carry non-nested information 
(Dretske 1981, 136ff). Dretske’s condition on analog representations carrying non-nested 
information captures the fact that icons compose features holistically; if each part of an icon 
represents multiple properties at once, then a representation of one feature will have to also 
represent a value along another feature dimension, and thus will necessarily carry non-nested 
information.9 
                                                 
9 There are many other senses of ‘analog’ in the literature, too many to detail here. Goodman’s (1976) notion of 
“density,” i.e., that between any two atomic representations there lies a third, is arguably far too stringent (though 
Haugeland [1998, 82–83] pointed out that it is “everybody’s aboriginal intuitive idea of analog systems”). 
Goodman’s account nonetheless captures (inter alia) the fact that distance relations between parts of icons 
correspond to distance relations in what’s represented and that properties represented in icons vary along 
continuous (though not necessarily dense) feature dimensions; hence it will typically (but not always) be true that 
between any two parts of an icon lies another part and that between any two values along a particular dimension 
lies a third value. David Lewis (1971) argues that analog representations use magnitudes to represent magnitudes, 
which is true of icons (Carey 2009, 118–135). Icons may be best understood as supersets of coordinates along 
analog feature dimensions, thereby capturing all these conditions on analogicity (Quilty-Dunn 2017). If parts of 
icons vary along multiple continuous dimensions at once—e.g., part of a photograph might simultaneously have 
values along dimensions of hue, saturation, brightness, and the spatial x- and y-axes of the image—then they can 
be modeled as coordinates. In that case, parts of icons will map continuous magnitudes to continuous magnitudes, 
values will be holistically bound together in each set of coordinates, and it will often be that between any two 
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The best way to substantiate the claim that parts of icons correspond to parts of the 
scene and represent multiple features holistically is simply to demonstrate its explanatory 
utility. In the following section, I will describe some evidence that supports the thesis that 
perceptual systems output mental representations that are iconic in this sense. One might 
object to the notion of iconicity developed here. A successful version of this objection that still 
sought to appeal to iconicity in explaining perception would require an alternative notion of 
iconicity with independent empirical substantiation. Block (ms.) writes that nobody has 
adequately defined iconicity, and as noted above, my aim is not to provide such a definition. 
But even if nobody has adequately defined iconicity, the phenomena discussed in the following 
section that are explained by appeal to iconicity indirectly provide a characterization in terms 
of parts that represent parts and encode features holistically. 
§3. Evidence for Perceptual Icons 
I’ll now argue that there is considerable non-demonstrative evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that at least some of the representations outputted by perceptual systems are iconic (i.e., are 
“perceptual icons”). It’s important to note at the outset that accepting this hypothesis does not 
necessitate that all perceptual representation is iconic and is therefore compatible with 
perceptual pluralism. Even such a staunch defender of iconic format in perception and 
perceptual imagery as Kosslyn still affirms that “there are two sorts of representations 
                                                 
values along a continuous dimension there lies a third. There may be mental representations that are analog in 
some sense but are not iconic, since they use magnitudes to represent magnitudes but fail to bind them to 
spatiotemporal values, such as analog magnitudes in numerical cognition (Clarke ms.). Though these analog 
representations encode features one-by-one, they simply do not compose features together at all (e.g., numerosity 
can be represented independently of location or other features). There is good reason to think that when analog 
representations do compose features like color, shape, and location together, however, they do so in a manner that 
obeys the principles of holistic binding and parts correspondence that are characteristic of iconicity (e.g., in 
ensemble perception and mental imagery). Since the perceptual object representations discussed in Section 4 
below compose features together non-holistically, they tell against any analog-based account of perceptual object 
representation; there is no independent reason to suppose analog feature dimensions can bind together without 
doing so holistically. Intuitively, while you might be able to have separate analog representations for color and 
shape, an analog representation that simultaneously represents both—e.g., an image—does so by means of the 
same parts of the representation and is therefore holistic. Finally, I note that Haugeland’s (1998) distinction 
between analog and digital representation eschews format differences entirely, but while his theory is of interest, 




underlying images, one ‘perceptual’…and one discursive” (1980, 142), the latter constituting 
“a list of facts in a propositional format” (1980, 144). 
 The evidence for perceptual icons is broad and diverse, and too large to be chronicled 
here with any reasonable degree of completeness. One such example is topographic mapping 
in sensory cortices, where (e.g.) spatial location and features like edge orientation are 
holistically bound together (Kosslyn 1994). 
Another is high-capacity sensory memory stores (Sperling 1960), such as “iconic 
memory.” Sperling briefly showed subjects rows of (e.g., 9) letters. Subjects could name only 
3 or 4. But when a row was cued after the letters disappeared, subjects could name nearly all 
the letters in that row; this suggests that a high-capacity representation is briefly stored early 
in visual processing. The high capacity of early sensory memory stores can be explained by 
icons that lack constituents for separate individuals and can thus store additional items without 
requiring additional vehicles (Fodor 2007). Moreover, holistic feature-binding requires icons 
to encode many features at once (Dretske 1981).10 Bronfman et al., for example, found that 
color properties of rows of letters are represented “spontaneously and without cost” (2014, 
1401) in a task that involves encoding the letterforms of only a single row; the fact that color 
comes for free with shape in this way is a prime example of high-capacity holistic feature 
binding. There is controversy about whether all the information in such studies is represented 
consciously (Phillips 2011; Block 2014a; Ward et al. 2016), but there is general consensus that 
the information is represented, which suggests iconic format whether or not it phenomenally 
overflows cognitive access (cf. Gross & Flombaum 2017; Quilty-Dunn ms.). Indeed, the 
apparent richness and fine-grainedness of perceptual phenomenology may constitute another 
form of evidence for nonconceptual perceptual icons (Tye 2006). 
I’ll now focus in detail on two examples: mental imagery and ensemble perception. 
The purpose of the following discussion is twofold—first, to argue that there are perceptual 
icons, and second, to show that perceptual icons obey the principles outlined in the previous 
section, especially that they lack separate symbols for separate properties and individuals. 
3.1—Mental imagery. The imagery debate has been raging since the early 1970s, with Kosslyn, 
Shepard, and others defending the iconic interpretation, and Pylyshyn, Dennett and others 
defending the discursive interpretation. Phenomena like mental rotation (Shepard and Metzler 
                                                 
10 Fragile visual short-term memory is another sensory memory store and also seems to be iconic, as suggested by 
its high capacity and holistic binding of shapes to locations (Pinto et al. 2013). 
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1971) and image scanning (Kosslyn et al. 1978) seem to show that differences in processing 
speed are proportional to spatial differences in what is represented, suggesting that the 
processing involves manipulating or “scanning” iconic mental images with functional 
analogues of the spatial properties of the represented scene.  
Finke and Pinker (1982), for example, showed participants a picture containing four 
dots; then the picture disappeared and was replaced by an arrow pointing in a specific 
direction, and participants were asked whether the arrow was pointing at one of the previously 
presented dots. Reaction times increased proportionally to the degree of distance between the 
arrow and the dot. The iconic interpretation of this effect is that the subjects form a mental 
image of the dots and compare the orientation of the arrow. The proportionality between 
distance and reaction time is explained by appeal to the functional–spatial structure of the icon 
itself. 
This explanation invokes iconic representations with parts that correspond to parts of 
the scene. In order for reaction times to increase when reporting on greater distances between 
the arrow and the dot, subjects must need to access intermediate location values one after 
another such that a greater number of intermediate location values takes more time. There 
must therefore be parts of the representation that correspond to locations in the scene such 
that scanning over a longer distance requires scanning over more parts of the image.  
Moreover, parts of the representation not only correspond to parts of the scene, they 
also encode both the location and any shape present at that location. The functional 
relationship between the part of the representation that represents the arrow and the parts that 
represent each dot is explained by the fact that each of those parts also represents a certain 
location value, thus situating representation of shape within a larger functional–spatial array. 
One cannot access the shape of the arrow without accessing its location, suggesting holistic 
binding. Iconic explanations of image-scanning therefore invoke the holistic character of 
icons.11 
                                                 
11 Pylyshyn (2002; 2003) has argued strenuously for a purely discursive model of mental imagery. I cannot engage 
with his arguments at length here (see Kosslyn et al. 2006). It’s worth noting, however, that so-called 
“iconophobic” models of mental imagery have perennially been on the defensive, while the most exciting 
empirical developments have been driven by iconic models of mental imagery despite constant (and useful) 
methodological critique from Pylyshyn and others. The predictive success and resilience of iconic models is a 
powerful reply to such critiques (Prinz 2002). 
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Imagery occurs in topographically mapped cortical areas also used in online vision 
(Kosslyn et al. 2006, chapter 5). Topographically mapped areas of visual cortex are also the 
loci of the informational persistence involved in iconic memory (Duysens et al. 1985), 
suggesting a commonality of format. Imagery can also enhance perceptual discrimination in 
the same sort of task as online perceptual learning (Grzeczkowski et al. 2015). Moreover, vision 
and visual imagery compete for resources (Pearson et al. 2015). The thesis that visual imagery 
and early vision share the same representational format explains these interactions. 
3.2—Ensemble perception. People can only explicitly individuate about four individual objects 
at once (Pylyshyn 2003). Nonetheless, there is evidence that we extract statistical regularities 
in scenes by computing over many more than four objects. This capacity is known as ensemble 
perception or perception of summary statistics.  
In a pioneering study, Ariely (2001) showed participants as many as 16 circles of 
varying diameters. Participants were then shown a probe circle and asked whether it was 
identical to one of the 16 just seen. They were more likely to answer “yes” the closer the 
diameter of the probe was to the mean diameter of the set (independently of whether the probe 
actually was a member of the set). This result requires participants to encode the average 
diameter of the set of circles even though they do not encode each individual circle as such. 
Furthermore, they were also above chance when asked explicitly whether a probe was greater 
or smaller in diameter than the average of the set. 
Ensemble perception suggests that participants represent an array of items without 
deploying a discursive representation for each individual item that can be stored and used for 
report. If participants deployed discursive representations for each individual item, then they 
should succeed at identifying an object as a member of the set. But Ariely found that “observers 
were unable to distinguish test spots that were in the set from those that were not” (2001, 
159). Similar effects have been found for color (Haberman, Brady & Alvarez 2015), location 
and motion direction (Hubert-Wallander & Boynton 2015), and even facial emotions 
(Haberman & Whitney 2012). 
Ensemble perception can be explained by supposing that perceptual icons function as 
inputs to processes that extract statistical averages. This explanation in terms of iconic inputs 
to ensemble coding can explain why participants lack information about whether an individual 
item was a member of the presented set as well as why ensemble coding can average over so 
many items—the items were encoded iconically and were not segmented out and represented 
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by distinct discursive representations (see also Fodor’s [2007] discussion of “item effects”). 
Ensemble perception also proceeds independently of loading visual working memory with 
discursive representations (Epstein & Emmanouil 2017). Moreover, the fact that ensembles 
seem to be storable in iconic memory (Bronfman et al. 2014) provides independent support 
for their iconicity. 
Moreover, people with prosopagnosia (or “face blindness”) perceive ensemble 
properties for faces such as average emotion and identity, with performance comparable to 
control subjects with normal face-recognitional abilities (Leib et al. 2012). The same subjects 
who are unable to identify individual faces, therefore, nonetheless perceive the average identity 
of a crowd of 18 faces. If ensembles are computed on the basis of iconic representations that 
fail to deploy discursive symbols for individual items, this discrepancy can be explained. 
Prosopagnosics may be unable to deploy discursive representations for individual faces (thus 
explaining their failure to recognize individual faces) but retain the capacity to iconically 
represent an array of faces, which can then be averaged over.12 
There is good (tentative, abductive) reason to suppose that there are perceptual icons. 
But as we will see below, not all representations delivered by perceptual systems are iconic. 
§4. Perceptual Object Representations 
The most striking example of discursive format in perception occurs in object perception. 
Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (1992) showed the existence of an “object-specific preview 
benefit” (OSPB) in a kind of experiment known as an object-reviewing paradigm. In the 
object-reviewing paradigm, participants are presented with two objects (e.g., circles) in which 
features are previewed (e.g., letters). The features then disappear and the objects move in 
different directions. Then a feature flashes in one of the objects and participants answer 
whether it’s one of the previewed features or not (or simply name the feature). It doesn’t matter 
for the task which object the feature was originally previewed in. If, however, the same feature 
was previewed in that particular object originally, participants are quicker at identifying a 
match. For example, in Figure 2, participants would be quicker to recognize the ‘T’ as a match 
if it were presented in the same object in both the preview and target displays. This is true even 
though the objects are qualitatively identical (thus the effect is not feature based) and move 
                                                 
12 This explanation posits that some aspects of face perception deliver and operate over discursive 
representations—for more discussion, see Quilty-Dunn 2017.  
14 
 
locations after previewing (thus the effect is not location based). The effect is genuinely object 
specific.  
Kahneman et al. posited the existence of “object files” to explain the coherence of 
scene-level visual perception across changes in retinal stimulation, leading to the prediction of 
an OSPB (Kahneman and Treisman 1984). Object files are representations of particular 
objects that do not represent objects via any particular feature, but rather bind features by 
attributing them to the same object. 
 
Figure 2—An object-reviewing paradigm (adapted from Mitroff et al. 2005) 
Object files are linked to the “visual indexes” or “FINSTs” studied by Pylyshyn, Scholl, 
and others. While the notion of object files arose from studying the OSPB, the notion of visual 
indexes came from studying multiple-object tracking (MOT). In the classic MOT paradigm, 
participants foveate on a fixation cross while roughly eight objects (e.g., squares) populate the 
rest of the stimulus (Pylyshyn & Storm 1988). Some small number (e.g., four) of the objects 
will flash, indicating that they are to be tracked, while the rest are to be ignored. Participants 
are remarkably good at tracking three or four objects, even when the objects are qualitatively 
identical and intersect each other’s paths and even when they are occluded by hidden barriers.  
Visual indexes and object files are plausibly manifestations of the same underlying 
capacity. Object files need spatiotemporal addresses of objects to maintain identity over time 
and across changes, which would be supplied by a visual index. MOT leads properties of 
objects to be encoded and stored (Bahrami 2003) and boosts the OSPB (Haladjian & Pylyshyn 
2008). These results suggest that visual indexes and object files are bound together in 
perceptual representations of objects. 
In order to avoid confusion, I will refer to perceptual object representations (PORs). 
PORs are representations of objects that select individuals through the deployment of a visual 
index and store information about the objects they represent. 
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The mere existence of PORs places pressure on a wholly iconic model of perception. 
Object perception requires a segmentation of the percept into constituent PORs, and thus rule 
out a naïve view of perception on which the visual system delivers a single pure, unsegmented 
icon. This view is obviously implausible, however, since other forms of segmentation like 
figure-ground segregation or other forms of perceptual grouping are incompatible with it as 
well. Instead, anti-pluralists can allow that the visual system segments the visual field, but still 
require that every output of perceptual segmentation processes is an icon.  
Carey (2009) cites evidence that, when shown two groups of cracker that are then 
hidden in buckets, children crawl toward the bucket with more overall cracker; however, this 
only occurs when the number of individual crackers is three or less, suggesting that object 
representations are involved (Feigenson et al. 2002). However, it is unclear why the mere 
ability to represent and sum over surface area implicates iconic format, since surface area can 
be represented in any format. This experiment therefore doesn’t seem directly to probe 
representational format. 
There is a wealth of evidence that does bear directly on the format of PORs. It strongly 
suggests that PORs are not icons. 
(i) Visual indexes. PORs incorporate an index-like representation of individual objects. 
The evidence for this hypothesis is that MOT works despite dramatic changes in features. For 
example, Zhou et al. (2010) found that changing color, luminous flux, and various shape 
properties did not disrupt MOT. Bahrami (2003) introduced a change detection task, where 
objects in an MOT paradigm moved around and an object might change its shape or color. 
Subjects often failed to register changes despite successfully tracking the objects (especially 
when a “mud splash” appeared on the screen during the change), though detection of changes 
were better for tracked objects than untracked objects (see also Scholl et al. 1999; Saiki 2003). 
This evidence suggests that, while features are bound to objects in MOT, the binding 
is not holistic. The representation of the object can persist even though features are changing 
or lost entirely. If the representation of a feature is syntactically separate from the 
representation of the object, then we would predict that they could detach from one another 
in the way suggested by these results. This syntactic separation precludes holistic binding and 
instead requires a distinct constituent that stands for individual objects apart from various 
features. Thus PORs are not icons. 
This argument is not meant to deny that an icon could represent changing features—
motion pictures would be a salient counterexample. But it is not obvious that such an icon 
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would explicitly and continuously represent the unchanging identity of an object without the 
help of some additional representational apparatus, such as a label-like representation 
persisting across the various changes and securing explicit reference. Nor is the argument 
meant to deny that an icon could ever lose features (e.g., a color image might somehow become 
black and white). However, the hypothesis that a POR is a holistically bound iconic 
representation of an object and its various features would not straightforwardly predict the free 
loss of even basic low-level features amid successful continuous tracking. Instead, we should 
expect that features and objects, once bound together, will generally be stored together or lost 
together. While the change and loss of features is not logically incompatible with an iconic 
model of PORs, therefore, it is more readily predicted and more easily explained by a discursive 
one. 
The foregoing argument also doesn’t require that indexes are label-like in the strong 
sense of being genuine mental analogues of bare demonstratives such as ‘this’. Pylyshyn (2008) 
holds that view, and it is indeed incompatible with an iconic model of PORs. But what matters 
is only that the binding between indexes and feature representations is not holistic. The 
evidence calls for a representation of an object that comes apart from representations of color, 
luminosity, and various shape properties. This alone is sufficient to reject the view that a POR 
is an icon. An icon that encodes the color, shape, and location of an object does so holistically, 
and PORs lack this sort of holistic binding. This is true even if the indexical components of 
PORs always encode certain properties (e.g., location, trajectory, and even topological shape 
[Zhou et al. 2010]).  
(ii) Abstract features. The fact that the indexical components of PORs are not iconic 
may be compatible with features’ being encoded via an icon. The evidence tells against this 
view as well. Before looking at the evidence, however, note an a priori problem. This hybrid 
view holds that the indexical components of PORs are not iconic, and that featural 
components are; thus PORs comprise multiple formats at once. But how? If these 
representations are in genuinely distinct formats, the proponent of the hybrid view must offer 
an account of how they compose. 
This a priori point is not necessary to defeat the hybrid view, however. The object-
reviewing paradigm can be used to determine how features are stored in PORs, which in turn 
can shed light on representational format. A series of experiments have showed abstract 
properties to be explicitly represented in PORs (Quilty-Dunn 2016). Henderson (1994) found 
an OSPB for letters previewed in objects even when the letters differed in case from preview 
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to test displays. Gordon & Irwin (1996) used entire words, e.g., ‘bread’ appeared in the 
preview display and ‘BREAD’ in the test display. Given that there are no shapes in common 
from ‘bread’ to ‘BREAD’, the identity of the word must be stored in a format that abstracts 
away from shape properties.  
If features were represented iconically in PORs, then they should be bound together 
holistically. In that case, a POR should represent high-level properties like the semantic 
identities of words in a way that is bound up with representations of low-level properties—
one should not find a high-level property represented independently of low-level properties. 
That’s not to say that icons can’t represent high-level properties; rather, they should only do 
so holistically, just as Figure 1 represents Dylan, but in a way that is bound up with low-level 
properties (fi.e., with his specific appearance in that photograph). Burge, for example, writes 
regarding face perception that “higher-level facial attributives never float free from low-level 
geometrical attributions” (2014a, 578). These object-reviewing results nonetheless show non-
holistic encoding of high-level properties that float free from low-level properties. 
Burge (2014a) appeals to a distinction between specific and generic low-level 
properties that ground perceptual attribution of high-level properties. For example, there 
might be a generic banana-shape property that the visual system uses to ground perceptual 
attribution of the kind banana. One might therefore object that the studies just cited only 
show high-level properties floating free from specific low-level features, not generic low-level 
features.  
A later study by Gordon & Irwin (2000) found the OSPB even when preview stimuli 
were words and test stimuli were corresponding pictures. For example, the previewed features 
might be the words ‘apple’ and ‘bread’ and the test stimulus would be a match if it were a 
picture of either an apple or a loaf of bread (see Fig. 3). Gordon & Irwin found that response 
times were quicker if the picture of the apple occurred in the same object in which ‘apple’ was 
previewed. There are no low-level features in common between the word ‘apple’ and a picture 
of an apple—not even highly generic low-level features. The POR needs to store a 
representation of the category apple in a way that completely abstracts away from generic as 
well as specific low-level features. This capacity would be explicable if what’s being stored is a 
distinct symbol that has the content <apple> and is bound to other features of the object only 
in a separable, non-holistic fashion. That is, the capacity is explicable if the category is encoded 




Figure 3—Illustration of Gordon & Irwin (2000) 
If discursive representations of categories are bound into PORs non-holistically, then 
we should expect category representations bound into PORs in one modality to be accessible 
by another modality. This is precisely what Jordan et al. (2010) found. Jordan et al. used 
pictures as preview features, after which objects would move to either side of the screen. 
Subjects then heard a sound come from one side and had to indicate whether the sound 
matched either of the previewed pictures. For example, suppose objects 1 and 2 are in the 
center of the display and the previewed pictures are a telephone (1) and a cat (2); 1 and 2 then 
move to the left and right, respectively. Hearing either a telephone ring or a meow from either 
side would be a match but hearing a dog bark would not. Jordan et al. found an OSPB: subjects 
were quicker to identify a sound as a match if it came from the same side as the corresponding 
object. That is, subjects would be faster if they heard a meow from the right than if it came 
from the left, since object 2 was previewed with a picture of a cat and moved to the right. The 
effect is not due to post-perceptual activation of lexical representations like ‘cat’, since subjects 
engaged in articulatory suppression (i.e., repeated words in their head during the study), thus 
loading verbal working memory. 
This result vindicates the idea that discursive symbols that stand for categories and 
abstract away from low-level features are stored in PORs without using a modality-specific 
format. The authors draw this very conclusion, hypothesizing that PORs “store object-related 
information in an amodal format that can be flexibly accessed across senses” (2010, 500). 
One might try to explain these results through a classical empiricist strategy—namely, 
by appeal to associative connections between modality-specific icons. Perhaps a visual icon of 
a cat, for example, is associatively linked to lexical representations like ‘cat’ and auditory 
representations like the sound of a meow, such that seeing the shape of a cat causes the 
activation of an auditory representation. This explanation fails for two reasons.  
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First, associative learning involves a “gradual strengthening of something” through 
repeated exposures (Gallistel & King 2009, 220), while a single presentation of a feature in an 
object generates the OSPB. There are cases of one-shot associative learning (i.e., learning an 
association in a single exposure that is then modulable through extinction). But the classic 
examples of one-shot learning of associations—taste aversion (Logue 1979) and avoidance 
learning (Seligman 1970)—involve high-arousal affective states such as pain and fear. They 
also involve species-specific prepared learning (e.g., rats will associate a painful shock with 
audiovisual stimuli but not gustatory stimuli and will associate a noxious feeling with gustatory 
stimuli but not audiovisual stimuli [Garcia & Koelling 1966]; see also Bolles 1970). There is 
no independent reason to suppose that this sort of one-shot associative learning underwrites 
the OSPB, which involves neither high-arousal affect nor biologically prepared learning. 
Second, an associative explanation makes a clear prediction: the OSPB should be found 
for items associated with the previewed item. Gordon and Irwin (1996) specifically tested this 
by presenting words as preview features and associated or non-associated words as test features 
and running a lexical decision task where subjects indicated whether the test feature was a word 
or non-word. While they found a general priming effect (i.e., reaction time was quicker for 
discriminating test words associated with a previewed word), they found no object-specific 
benefit for associated items. That is, while reading the word ‘doctor’ in an object did cause 
general facilitation for the word ‘nurse’ over unrelated words like ‘bread’ (as an associative 
model predicts), the associated word meaning was not bound into the object file. Therefore 
the effects that show an OSPB for categories cannot simply be associations between iconically 
represented features. 
These results show that the thesis that PORs encode features in an iconic format is 
empirically untenable.  
(iii) Low-level features. As a last retreat, one might admit that indexes and abstract 
categories are represented discursively in PORs but hold on to the idea that low-level features 
are represented iconically. This view preserves anti-pluralism in name only. It concedes that 
amodal discursive symbols are deployed by the visual system alongside icons and therefore 
seems to be a version of perceptual pluralism. The concessive anti-pluralist could still insist 
that this view preserves the claim that every output of the visual system is at least partly iconic.  
Unfortunately, even this view is not consistent with the evidence. If low-level features 
are represented in an icon in each POR, then low-level features are bound holistically and thus 
should not come apart from one another. As mentioned above, Bahrami (2003) found that 
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participants often failed to store information about the shape and color of tracked objects in 
an MOT paradigm (though not as often as they failed to store features of untracked objects). 
Bahrami also found differences in when shape and color were lost. For example, in trials 
without a distracting mud splash, color changes were detected significantly more often than 
shape changes. Thus there were trials where color was preserved and shape lost in a POR.13 
Green and Quilty-Dunn (forthcoming) argue that low-level features are not encoded 
iconically in PORs on the basis of independent feature storage in object representations in 
visual working memory. They cite evidence that subjects can, e.g., store the color of a triangle 
in a POR without its orientation, and vice versa (Fougnie & Alvarez 2011). Green and Quilty-
Dunn argue that this result shows non-holistic feature binding, and thus non-iconic format, 
in low-level feature representations bound into PORs.14  
Other evidence consistent with this hypothesis shows that storage limits in PORs are 
individuated by type of feature. For example, Wang et al. (2017) first showed participants 
colored triangles at various orientations, took them away for a delay period, and finally 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that, in general, change blindness results do not demonstratively prove loss of stored 
information. It is consistent with Bahrami’s results that subjects merely failed to compare successfully stored 
information with the information in the post-change display, as Bahrami himself notes (2003, 962), following 
Simons (2000). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. However, the independent evidence 
discussed below for separate feature dimensions being represented by separate symbols seems to provide at least 
some reason to favor an interpretation of Bahrami’s results as showing a genuine loss of stored information. It’s 
also worth noting that increasing encoding time and using precision-sensitive tests had no impact on independent 
feature loss in the Fougnie and Alvarez (2011) study discussed below, which suggests that independent feature 
loss in PORs is not simply an artifact of some performance constraint but genuinely involves the independent 
storage and loss of features (see also Park et al. 2017). Finally, the Bahrami study found enhanced change detection 
for tracked items; thus subjects did seem to successfully access their object representations. This provides some 
reason to think the results may not be a matter of access failure (though comparison failure is still possible). See 
note 17 for more discussion of the relation between object correspondence and change blindness. 
14 Block (ms.) appeals to a distinction between properties that are integral and those that are not, i.e., groups of 
properties that must be instantiated together (like hue and saturation) and those that need not (like height and 
speed). I’m skeptical of this distinction, since it seems to me that every object with a certain height must also have 
a certain speed—even if that speed is zero—and likewise for the other “separable” features Block mentions. That 
worry aside, however, the notion of integrality is tied to feature types rather than to syntactic modes of 
composition and thus differs from the holisticity of icons. Block claims that some icons can fail to be represent 
integrally, as when an icon encodes the width of a volume of liquid but no (determinate) height even though 
width and height must be coinstantiated. But these sorts of cases involve features that fail to be encoded together 
at all rather than features that are encoded together and then come apart individually. As argued above, what 
matters for the holistic character of iconicity is not that features are always encoded together but rather that, when 
they are encoded together, they are represented by means of the same parts of the representation and thus should 
not be expected to come apart as readily as if they had been encoded by means of separate vehicles. Block’s appeal 
to icons that lack integrality therefore cannot be used to accommodate the evidence discussed here. 
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displayed a second array of colored triangles that did or didn’t change one of the colors or 
orientations. They also varied the number of different feature values (such that an array of six 
triangles could have six different colors and only two orientations or vice versa). They found 
that increasing the number of feature values along one dimension significantly damaged 
performance on the change detection task for that feature, but not for the other. 
On an iconic model, storing both the color and orientation of an object is simply a 
matter of storing one and the same iconic symbol. It’s not obvious why the storage capacities 
for color and orientation would differ if both features are stored by means of the same symbol. 
On that sort of model, storing color and storing orientation would be accomplished by storing 
the very same representation, and thus ceteris paribus one would expect aspects of their storage 
(such as required encoding time, capacity, and duration) to be equivalent (as the evidence once 
seemed to suggest [Luck & Vogel 1997]). But if instead features in different dimensions are 
stored by means of discrete symbols, then the storage capacity for color (represented by one 
symbol) and for orientation (represented by another) could easily vary independently. The fact 
that storage capacities differ for distinct feature dimensions is therefore better explained by 
separate symbols for separate features that can be stored independently from one another. 
Green and Quilty-Dunn (forthcoming) argue that a large body of evidence supports a 
“multiple-slots” model of object-based storage in VWM, where representations along different 
feature dimensions are stored in dimension-specific slots whose storage capacities vary 
independently. The idea of storing representations of features in separate working-memory 
slots is hard to square with a model on which features are holistically bound into a single iconic 
symbol. 
There is no compelling positive evidence for iconic format in PORs and a plethora of 
compelling evidence against iconic format in PORs. Combined with the arguments in favor 
of perceptual icons in the previous section, there is good reason to think that the visual system 
outputs both iconic and discursive representations. In other words, perceptual pluralism is 
true. 
§5. PORs in Perception 
One might object that PORs are not genuinely perceptual, and hence don’t bear on the format 
of perception. In that case, the moniker ‘POR’ is a misnomer; for the rest of this section I will 
instead use the neutral term ‘object file’. 
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The view that object representation is always post-perceptual was famously defended 
by Elizabeth Spelke, who argued that perception proper represents only a “continuous layout 
of surfaces in a state of continuous change” and not coherent “units” (1988, 229). Spelke’s 
argument, however, simply assumes that perceptual representations are exclusively iconic. Her 
argument would rule out any form of segmentation as being genuinely perceptual, and 
therefore seems to assume an overly impoverished view of perceptual representation. 
Moreover, much of what drives Spelke’s argument is the fact that object files are accessible 
across modalities and represent relatively high-level properties like solidity. Similarly, Carey 
argues that object files are in “core cognition” rather than perception (though see Carey 2011) 
because they “cannot be stated in the vocabulary of perception” (2009, 63) since they do not 
reduce to “perceptual or sensori-motor primitives” (2009, 67). But the thesis that object files 
have a discursive format can explain these properties without positing that these 
representations are in any sense post-perceptual. 
Carey also argues that object files have a “rich conceptual role” (2009, 94). She cites 
evidence that “infants as young as 2 months old represent physical relations between objects 
such as inside and behind, and their representations are constrained by knowledge of solidity—
a property of real objects but not of 2-D visual objects” (2009, 103). She also mentions that 
infants expect objects to be “subject to the laws of contact causality” and that they “represent 
objects as the goals of human action” and “represent self-moving agents as the cause of motion 
of inanimate objects” (2009, 103). Carey concludes that object files figure in inferences and 
“play a central conceptual role” (2009, 103). 
Some of this evidence seems to be explained in terms of the fact that object files encode 
properties like solidity that influence looking times and other behavioral measures. This 
capacity does not in itself require a central conceptual role (though it arguably would if it were 
true that perceptual content must reduce to transduced primitives). Other evidence does seem 
suggestive of genuine inferential transitions. But in all these cases object files function as 
premises in central-cognitive inferences, not conclusions. A representation might wholly belong 
to the visual system and yet be fed into cognition to function as a premise in inferences, and 
perceptual representations in the same discursive format as cognition would be poised to do 
so. The highly constrained “conceptual role” of object files therefore does not suffice to show 
that they are post-perceptual. 
Block (ms.) pursues a different strategy. According to Block, the outputs of perception 
are iconic, and include iconic perceptual object representations; object files are, for Block, only 
23 
 
present in visual working memory (VWM) and are largely discursive.15 Block does not 
explicitly concede that evidence of the sort discussed in the previous section establishes that 
object files are discursive, but his main line of response is to insist that experiments involving 
the object-specific preview benefit (OSPB) and other evidence cited above probe post-
perceptual object files. 
Object files were not originally posited as constituents of VWM. Instead, they were 
posited to explain proprietarily visual phenomena, and were considered “mid-level” constructs 
of the visual system, after the most basic feature detection but prior to late vision or post-
perceptual processing (Kahneman et al. 1992). A well-known problem in vision science 
concerns the correspondence of two temporally contiguous and qualitatively distinct retinal 
inputs (Ullman 1979). Object files were posited partially to solve this correspondence problem 
by allowing changes in retinal input due to (i) the movement of objects, (ii) changes in the 
features of objects, or (iii) saccades, i.e., movement of the eyes, to be coherently integrated by 
appeal to representations of enduring objects (Kahneman et al. 1992, 179). Segmenting the 
world into coherent, enduring units that can gain, lose, or change features while retaining their 
identity allows visual processing to make sense of retinal input. Without object representations, 
vision would be as William James imagined it to be for infants, a “blooming, buzzing 
confusion.”  
For Block’s proposal to be correct, OSPB-based experiments cannot actually probe the 
outputs of mid-level vision (or at least, not in the same format), despite the fact that they were 
designed to do so. For if they did, then the evidence detailed in the previous section would 
show that perceptual object representations are discursive. It is crucial for Block, then, that 
representations that solve the correspondence problem and representations held in VWM 
                                                 
15 Block argues that the iconic elements of object files are mainly limited to spatial properties. This view is prima 
facie implausible since, if perceptual object representations are entirely iconic and object files in VWM merely 
add a discursive overlay (like adding a caption to an image), then we would expect low-level properties generally 
to be encoded iconically in VWM. The evidence cited above tells against this prediction. It’s unclear why spatial 
properties would be preserved in VWM in their original iconic format without, say, color; without some 
independent motivation this hypothesis seems ad hoc. Moreover, there is evidence that spatial properties like 
length, gap presence, and orientation come apart from one another in VWM, suggesting that even spatial 
properties are not encoded iconically (Hardman & Cowan 2015; see also Green & Quilty-Dunn forthcoming). 
Online object perception also does not seem to be iconic, given that color and shape come apart from one another 
in MOT (e.g., Bahrami 2003). Furthermore, as mentioned above, icons in perception don’t merely represent 
spatial properties—they bind spatial properties holistically to other properties such as color (Bronfman et al. 
2014). If spatial properties were encoded iconically in online object perception, therefore, we should expect them 
to bind holistically to other properties, but they don’t. 
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don’t have the same format. I’ll argue shortly that the evidence suggests that they do. First, 
however, it will be helpful to consider the relation between object perception and VWM.  
There is evidence that object files can be held in VWM (Hollingworth & Rasmussen 
2010). There is, however, no reason to conclude from this that object files are not constructed 
by proprietary mid-level-visual processes or that the OSPB only probes object files after a 
transformation in format upon entering VWM. Top-down manipulation of representations 
in VWM is an instance of cognitive processing. But it does not follow that storage of 
representations in VWM is an instance of cognitive processing. And it certainly does not follow 
that representations stored in VWM are formed through post-perceptual cognitive processes, 
or that their formats are transformed upon entering VWM. As Burge writes, the “primary 
function” of working memory “is to preserve perception already formed” (2007, 501). 
Without independent reason to multiply types of object representations, it’s plausible that the 
same mid-level-visual representations that solve the correspondence problem can be held in 
VWM without transforming their formats and can be studied in the form in which perception 
delivers them by using the OSPB.  
For Block, there are iconic perceptual object representations and only some of their 
iconic aspects are inherited by object files in VWM. It is not obvious, however, how we can 
know anything about these iconic perceptual representations if not through the OSPB. One 
might appeal to MOT and its various effects, including the tunnel effect, wherein objects are 
perceived as moving continuously behind occluders (Flombaum & Scholl 2006). But as 
mentioned above, MOT facilitates feature storage (Bahrami 2003) and boosts the OSPB 
(Haladjian & Pylyshyn 2008), strongly suggesting that the vehicles of MOT (i.e., visual 
indexes) are constituents of object files. And as argued above, MOT shows non-holistic 
binding (Scholl et al. 1999; Bahrami 2003; Zhou et al. 2010). MOT thus cannot provide a 
method for studying putatively iconic perceptual object representations. MOT-based evidence 
provides good reason to think that the object representations formed in online perception and 
the discursive object files stored in VWM are one and the same.  
Block (ms.) argues that iconic object representations are studied via object-based 
attentional effects such as inhibition of return (i.e., the inhibition of attention back to an 
unchanged, previously attended object at its original location)—but the inhibition of return 
also makes use of VWM resources (e.g., Castel et al. 2003; see below for further discussion). 
Moreover, the OSPB and MOT are typically taken by researchers to be paradigm cases of 
object-based attention (Scholl 2001). Block also appeals to the influence of spatial information 
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on object representation as evidence for iconicity, but as noted above, the mere representation 
of spatial information is not evidence for iconic or discursive format. 
The view that discursive object representations are exclusively post-perceptual is 
unmotivated. But there is also more positive evidence that the object files held in VWM display 
the hallmarks of being genuinely perceptual. These hallmarks are (a) being informationally 
encapsulated from cognition, and (b) being integrated in perceptual processes. 
One form of evidence for the informational encapsulation of object files is the 
divergence between cognitive and perceptual criteria for object individuation and tracking. For 
example, we know that an object can expand and contract while maintaining its identity, but 
tracking is disrupted when that occurs (vanMarle & Scholl 2003). This is a case of 
informational encapsulation; the object perception system operates on its own proprietary 
store of information that excludes information stored in central cognition. This encapsulation 
also goes in both directions, since the information used for visual tracking is not accessible to 
cognition. It’s a surprising result that visual tracking is limited in this way, not a mere 
verification of something we already (cognitively) knew to be the case. 
Another, even more striking case of informational encapsulation was found by Mitroff 
et al. (2005). Mitroff et al. ran a typical OSPB paradigm, except the motion of the objects 
intersected in a way that was visually ambiguous between two objects “bouncing” off one 
another and two objects “streaming” through one another (see Fig. 4). In addition to testing 
for an OSPB in identifying a match between features presented before and after the ambiguous 
motion, they also asked subjects to judge whether the objects had bounced or streamed. 
Remarkably, they found a sharp divergence—the OSPB showed that the object files had 
bounced even though subjects judged the objects to have streamed through each other. This 
result is another clear example of informational encapsulation. The processes that output 
object files are stimulus driven and informationally encapsulated, and thus seem to be 
genuinely perceptual. Even if the OSPB paradigm probes object files only once they’re stored 
in VWM, the fact that the paradigm taps into encapsulated object representations provides 




Figure 4—From Mitroff et al. 2005 
This experiment also motivates strongly against the claim that object files are 
transformed in format upon entering VWM. If an object file’s format is transformed and its 
contents are subject to post-perceptual cognitive processes, then it should not show 
encapsulation from post-perceptual judgment. And if it fails to show encapsulation from post-
perceptual judgment, then we should not find the OSPB directly contradicting post-perceptual 
judgment. The Mitroff study thus provides strong evidence against the thesis that OSPB 
probes merely the “remnants of perception” (Block ms.) after intervention by post-perceptual 
cognitive processes; on the contrary, the OSPB probes object representations as they are 
delivered by encapsulated perceptual processes independently of cognition. OSPB-based 
evidence thus cannot be dismissed as tapping into representations that have been transformed 
by post-perceptual cognitive processes.16 
Another hallmark of a representation’s being genuinely perceptual is that it is 
integrated into perceptual processes, which object files are. One example is the demonstrated 
relationship between object files and visual indexes (Haladjian & Pylyshyn 2008). Another 
perceptual process which operates on object files is the guiding of saccades. Upon walking into 
an unfamiliar room, your eyes might wander around and thus “saccade” to various parts of the 
room. Perceived information about the scene is used to guide where we saccade and to 
maintain a stable percept across saccades. This phenomenon is undeniably perceptual. It is 
                                                 
16 An anonymous referee raises the worry that the Mitroff et al. (2005) study may undermine the claim that object 
files underlie perceptual phenomenology, which may in turn threaten their status as perceptual. While the result 
shows that object files can occur unconsciously (Quilty-Dunn forthcoming), it doesn’t show that they always 
occur unconsciously. As Mitroff et al. note, it’s compatible with their results that object files diverge from 
conscious experience only rarely, when stimuli are ambiguous in ways that concern the solidity constraint on 
object persistence (2005, 88–90). The hypothesis that object files are a crucial part of explaining aspects of visual 
phenomenology (e.g., solving the correspondence problem) doesn’t entail that they are sufficient for visual 
phenomenology. It’s compatible with this hypothesis that in ambiguous cases other processes may bias 




hard to imagine what seeing would be like if the visual system did not maintain information 
across saccades—our percepts would be an incoherent series of snapshots. Visual perception 
that did not store information across saccades would also fail to be useful for ordinary action. 
Our eyes are often moving as we perform an action, and in order to visually guide our actions 
effectively we must be able to maintain coherent visual percepts amid changes in where our 
eyes are pointing from one moment to the next. The ability to store and integrate visual 
information across saccades is critical for the coherence of visual phenomenology and the visual 
guidance of action. It is extremely implausible that all object-based representations and 
processes that endure across eye movements are post-perceptual cognitive ones. 
Episodic information used to guide saccades is referred to as “transsaccadic memory” 
(Irwin & Gordon 1998). Representations in transsaccadic memory are directly used for low-
level visuomotor tasks like tracking a moving object; an object might move while you saccade 
to it, and the ability to correctively saccade to its new location requires a transsaccadic memory 
store. While the guidance of saccades is sometimes under voluntary top-down control, the 
information stored about the scene is perceptual and is directly accessed and operated over by 
low-level sensorimotor processes. The representations stored in transsaccadic memory must be 
used by the visual system to solve the correspondence problem, i.e., to render visual 
phenomenology coherent across saccades. 
Object files are the constituents of transsaccadic memory (Irwin & Andrews 1996; 
Irwin & Gordon 1998; Henderson & Siefert 2000; Gordon & Vollmer 2010). Schut et al. 
(2017a), for example, found that corrective saccades are facilitated by previous fixations despite 
interim changes in location and features. They conclude that “corrective saccades are executed 
on the basis of object files” (Schut et al. 2017a, 138). 
Like object-reviewing paradigms, tests of transsaccadic memory can shed light on 
representational format. Irwin (1992) presented participants with an array of letters at one 
fixation and, after saccading, presented a partial report cue to a subset of letters, similar to the 
Sperling (1960) experiments discussed above. This experiment provides a clear test of the 
hypothesis that the correspondence problem is solved by means of iconic format, since if the 
visual system stores iconic representations across saccades, we should find the same behavioral 
signature found in tests of iconic memory. Unlike in the Sperling experiments, however, 
participants only showed storage of three or four letters—the same limit for discursive object 
representations. This result falsifies the claim that icons are used in deriving object 
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correspondence across saccades.17 Since object correspondence needs to be computed by the 
visual system (and not merely by some post-perceptual process—cf. Block ms.), then there 
must be non-iconic representations in the visual system. 
Pollatsek et al. (1984) had participants fixate on the center of the screen with an object 
in the periphery, then saccade to the object and name it. Changing the features of the object 
during the saccade slows down response time, showing that features are encoded in 
transsaccadic memory. Pollatsek et al. switched out objects with a different exemplar of the 
same basic-level category, with sometimes substantially different low-level features (e.g., a 
young cat with textured fur facing forward vs. an older cat without textured fur facing to the 
left, or dogs of two different breeds—see Fig. 5). They still found significant facilitation in 
naming the object despite the large change in low-level features. 
 
Figure 5—Stimuli from Pollatsek et al. 1984 
Rayner et al. (1980) used a similar paradigm with words instead of pictures and found 
that words could vary in case across saccades and still facilitate naming. Pollatsek et al. (1990) 
used similar stimuli to Pollatsek et al. (1984) but varied the location of objects pre- and post-
saccade. They still found significant facilitation despite the change in location and low-level 
features. This suggests that the abstract identity of the picture is encoded in transsaccadic 
memory without holistic binding to low-level features (see also Henderson & Siefert 2000).  
Objection: These transsaccadic memory effects only show storage of what Burge calls 
“generic” low-level features, like a generic cat shape. 
                                                 
17 As discussed above in note 13, change blindness is compatible with storage of information, since failure at 
change detection can arise from failure to compare past and present stimuli (Mitroff et al. 2004). The basic 
function of transsaccadic memory, however, is to compute object correspondence across saccades; this function 
requires not merely storage, but also successful comparison of information pre- and post-saccade such that the 
visual system can determine whether there is object correspondence (i.e., the same object in a different retinotopic 
location due to the saccade). Since the Irwin (1992) study shows a failure to integrate iconically represented 
information across saccades, the possibility that the results are explained by comparison failure does not 
undermine the point that iconic information is not used for transsaccadic object correspondence. 
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The objection is correct in that (e.g.) Pollatsek et al. (1984) did not control for this 
alternative. But the independent evidence that object files are stored in transsaccadic memory, 
together with the independent OSPB-based evidence that object files encode kinds 
independently of generic low-level features, should bias our interpretation of these results in 
favor of the claim that representations in transsaccadic memory explicitly encode abstract 
categories.  
Moreover, there is independent evidence within the transsaccadic memory literature 
to support the hypothesis that transsaccadic memory stores abstract categories. Gordon and 
Vollmer (2010) had participants saccade to a location between two objects, at which point the 
two objects were replaced by a single object. The task was to name this object. The object 
either did or didn’t match the category of one of the two previewed objects and may or may 
not have changed color. Gordon and Vollmer found an object-specific effect: a decrease in 
reaction time for naming the object above(/below) the fixation point if that object was 
previewed above(/below) fixation. This effect was significantly reduced when color changed, 
but only for objects with diagnostic colors. Thus the correspondence between transsaccadic 
representations of a banana depended on the yellow color of the banana, whereas 
correspondence for transsaccadic representations of an object without a diagnostic color (such 
as a bucket) did not depend on its color. This result suggests that the representation is not 
maintained merely on the basis of low-level properties; which low-level properties are used for 
object correspondence depends on their relation to abstract categories that are explicitly 
represented in transsaccadic memory (see also Gordon et al. 2008; Gordon 2014). This effect 
is predicted by a model on which discursive symbols are bound into object files that are held 
in transsaccadic memory and fails to be predicted by an iconic model. 
It is unclear what mechanism could solve the correspondence problem if not 
representations stored in transsaccadic memory. But these representations are not iconic and 
seem to be the same object files that are accessible to VWM. The evidence thus suggests that 
the representations that solve the correspondence problem (and are therefore genuinely 
perceptual) are identical to the discursive object files that figure in VWM. 
The view that transsaccadic memory only stores post-perceptual representations that 
fail to share a format with perception is ad hoc. But it also faces a more serious problem that 
arises from asserting simultaneously that object files are transformed into a conceptual 
discursive format after perception and yet also are used to guide saccades and solve the 
correspondence problem. If the format of object files has been changed to one that is not native 
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to low-level sensorimotor systems, how can such systems access and compute over them across 
saccades? It seems far more plausible to say instead that the discursive format of object files is 
in fact native (though not exclusive) to vision, and that this continuity of format between 
object representations in vision and in VWM explains how constituents of the latter can be 
operated over by low-level visuomotor processes. If iconic object representations solved the 
correspondence problem, then we should find signs of iconic format in transsaccadic memory, 
but we don’t. 
As mentioned above, Block argues that object-based attentional effects such as 
inhibition of return probe iconic, genuinely perceptual object representations while 
transsaccadic memory effects and the OSPB probe post-perceptual discursive object files. This 
dichotomy is untenable, however, given that object-based attention uses transsaccadic 
memory. For example, inhibition of return operates across saccades (Ro et al. 2000; Ludwig 
et al. 2009). In order for attention to be inhibited for a particular object across saccades, the 
representation of the object must be stored across saccades and must therefore be a constituent 
of transsaccadic memory—i.e., a discursive object file. There is evidence that inhibition of 
return relies on preparation of saccades, suggesting that transsaccadic memory mediates much 
or even all object-based inhibition of return (Rafal et al. 1989); for example, inhibiting 
subjects’ ability to saccade to a visible object minimizes inhibition of return (Michalczyk et al. 
2018). It would be extremely hard to explain these results if object-based attention were not 
driven by object representations in transsaccadic memory. Thus even the object-based 
attentional effects Block favors such as inhibition of return are explained by discursive object 
files rather than iconic object representations. This fact provides powerful independent 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that discursive object files are the vehicles of object-based 
attention. There is therefore no reason to posit more than a single (discursive) type of object 
representation. Any object representation that failed to survive across saccades would fail to be 
useful for human perception, cognition, and action, and the object representations that do 
survive across saccades appear to be discursive. 
One might make a blanket assumption that all working memory systems, including 
VWM, fall cleanly within the borders of cognition rather than perception. Block insists that 
transsaccadic memory is simply VWM, and there is indeed significant experimental evidence 
in favor of this claim (e.g., Schut et al. 2017b; Kleene & Michel 2018). These two assumptions 
together entail that transsaccadic memory is cognitive rather than perceptual (Block ms.). But 
in fact transsaccadic memory is central to visual processing. It allows the visual system to 
integrate information across saccades, a function that lies at the heart of the coherence of visual 
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phenomenology and the usefulness of vision for action. It also underwrites basic aspects of 
visual attention, such as the inhibition of return. The centrality of transsaccadic memory to 
visual processing should lead us to doubt the overly simplistic assumption that VWM is wholly 
post-perceptual and cognitive.  
Perceptual processes deliver perceptual representations, and these representations can 
be held in VWM. Once held in VWM, they can be used in specifically perceptual ways by 
perceptual processes; for example, they can be used by the visual system to maintain a coherent 
percept across saccades. The use of object representations in VWM for saccades taxes VWM 
capacity but not auditory working memory capacity (Schut et al. 2017b), suggesting both (a) 
that VWM is a modality-specific (rather than simply cognitive) store and (b) that the use of 
object representations to guide saccades deploys proprietarily visual mechanisms to fulfil a 
proprietarily visual function. Cognitive processing can also occur in VWM. VWM constitutes 
an interface between perception and cognition where perceptual information can be held and 
used for either perceptual or cognitive purposes. We should thus resist attempts to cordon off 
all representations in VWM as post-perceptual, on pain of not being able to make sense of 
core perceptual functions. The fact that the same representations delivered by the visual system 
into VWM can be used offline in cognitive processing only bolsters the hypothesis that 
perception and cognition often use the same discursive representational format. 
To sum up: object files are deployed via encapsulated input-driven processes, are used 
in low-level visuomotor and attentional processes, and are responsible for a basic form of 
coherence in perceptual phenomenology and object-based visual guidance of action. If there 
are iconic object representations in perception that never enter working memory (or change 
formats upon entering working memory), we have no convincing evidence of their existence. 
They also seem to play no role in solving the correspondence problem. We should conclude 
that object files are discursive, genuinely perceptual object representations formed by the visual 
system that can be held in working memory without transforming their representational 
format. 
§6. Conclusion  
Perceptual pluralism offers a rich and flexible account of how we perceive the world. The fact 
that perception outputs discursive representations can explain how cognition is able to use 
some perceptual information directly in updating beliefs and planning actions. The fact that 
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perception outputs iconic representations can explain how some aspects of perception are 
fundamentally different from discursive thought.  
Perceptual pluralism also opens up a potentially fruitful research program. Further 
work could aim to characterize the variety of formats that are outputted by perceptual 
processes. For example, face perception, gist perception (Mandelbaum forthcoming), 
structural perception (Green forthcoming), aspects of ensemble perception (Quilty-Dunn 
2017) and other perceptual capacities may deliver diverse representational formats.  
The pluralist picture advocated here has focused on a binary distinction between iconic 
and discursive formats. History may show that a more accurate picture will appeal to a range 
of distinct formats, or the iconic–discursive distinction may turn out to map onto the most 
explanatorily significant division among representational kinds. Or perhaps there are multiple 
discursive formats used in the mind, such that one could mount a format-based distinction 
between perception and cognition by appeal to different discursive representational structures. 
At present, however, the deployment of discursive representations in perception suggests a 
commonality of format between aspects of perception and cognition, thus undermining 
representational approaches to the perception–cognition border.  
The encapsulation of PORs is consistent with an architectural approach. Developing 
such an approach in a full and empirically plausible way remains a task for future research. 
However things shake out, it is unlikely that perception can be usefully distinguished from 
cognition by appeal to the difference between iconic and discursive representational formats.18
                                                 
18 Thanks to the audiences at the Rutgers-Barnard-Columbia Mind Workshop, the Philosophy of Mind Works 
in Progress group at Oxford, and the Thought and Sense conference at the University of Oslo for useful feedback. 
Thanks also to Zed Adams, Bahador Bahrami, Jake Beck, Jake Berger, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Sam Clarke, 
Ryan DeChant, Tatiana Aloi Emmanouil, E.J. Green, Steven Gross, Zoe Jenkin, Eric Mandelbaum, Michael 
Martin, John Morrison, David Papineau, Ian Phillips, Jesse Prinz, Nick Shea, Josh Shepherd, and Joulia 
Smortchkova for discussion and/or comments on an earlier draft. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for Noûs 
for extensive comments that greatly improved the paper. This project has received funding from the European 
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under 
grant agreement No 681422. 
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